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CONFLICTED MERGER TRANSACTIONS:
CONSOLIDATING THE STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Shrisha Juneja*
ABSTRACT
Mergers are structured in a variety of ways, in keeping with the
underlying purpose of the transaction. While this structural
flexibility is beneficial from a financial standpoint, it has resulted in
varied interpretations of the case law surrounding the standards of
review that govern conflicted merger transactions. Where there is no
apparent conflict of interest between the board of directors of a
corporation and the corporation’s shareholders, the courts have
traditionally accorded the board deference under the lenient business
judgment rule. On the other hand, where there is a direct conflict of
interest, the board is required to show the entire fairness of the
transaction. However, conflicted transactions that fall in-between
these two extremes have been reviewed in mixed ways, ultimately
resulting in shifts between the two standards of review. This Note
argues that there already exists an intermediate standard of review,
the enhanced scrutiny standard, which appropriately addresses the
potential underlying conflicts of interest in such transactions. This
Note calls for the application of the enhanced scrutiny standard to all
conflicted merger transactions regardless of their structure, which
would clarify existing law and provide a uniform standard of review.
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INTRODUCTION
This Note addresses the varying standards of review for mergers,
which exist due to the myriad methods of negotiating such transactions.
While the landmark cases Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493
A.2d 946 (Del. 1985) and Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes
Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986) addressed the standards of
review applicable in instances where the board of directors faced the
threat of a hostile takeover, they did not address the level of scrutiny
placed on a board in other instances.
Several cases since then have narrowly addressed the issue, but
each case is an isolated example of the level of care a board of directors
must assert in a particular transaction. In Kahn v. Lynch Communication
Systems, Inc., 638 A.2d 1110 (Del. 1994), the court required a review
under the entire fairness standard. The Delaware Chancery Court in In
re Pure Resources, Inc., Shareholders Litigation, 808 A.2d 421 (Del.
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Ch. 2002) further parsed the different standards of review based on
whether the merger was a result of a negotiation or a tender offer.
However, there still exists a lack of clarity as to whether the
standard of review for a conflicted merger should be the entire fairness
standard, the business judgment rule, or enhanced scrutiny. Configuring
the standards of review based on the structural elements of the
transaction has resulted in varying interpretations of the same basic
principle.
Finally, although a variety of literature exists on the roles of these
cases in elucidating the standards of review for mergers, this Note will
seek to consolidate the new standards set out by courts in recent years,
and highlight the areas where clarity is still required. The Note will also
propose a solution for addressing the potential conflict posed by the
differing standards of review, and address any gaps in the law. The Note
will serve as a useful outline of the information available to the board of
directors of a corporation for assessing the scrutiny it might face if its
decisions during a merger (or a similar transaction) are under review.
Accordingly, Part I provides an overview of the existing standards
of review for mergers, and their underlying principles; Part II discusses
the conflicting case law, and highlights areas where there is a lack of
clarity; Part III proposes a solution and calls for a consolidation of the
standards of review for mergers involving a conflict of interest.
I. MERGERS
Companies merge for a variety of reasons: when they expect
increased profits, anticipate a better competitive position, or simply wish
to diversify the products and services they offer. Regardless, the manner
in which these merger transactions are negotiated and ultimately
structured has a huge impact on any judicial review that the transaction
might face. As this Note shows, the different transactions are analyzed
under differing levels of scrutiny, depending on the level of perceived
conflict between the interests of the shareholders and those of the board
of directors.
A. FORMS OF MERGER TRANSACTIONS
Although mergers can be structured in a variety of ways, the two
most relevant to this discussion are mergers accomplished by combining

136

FORDHAM JOURNAL
OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW

[Vol. XXII

two companies with diversified shareholders, and those configured as
freeze-out transactions.1
1. The A-B Merger: Combination of Two Companies with Diversified
Shareholders
This involves a negotiated merger between two companies A and B
whose shareholders are dispersed. The transaction can be accomplished
in two ways.
a. Cash-based Transaction
Company B’s shareholders are bought out and only A’s
shareholders hold the resulting company AB’s stock. B’s shareholders
are no longer invested in company B or AB.
b. Stock-based Transaction
Company A’s stock is given to B’s shareholders. Here, both A’s
and B’s shareholders remain shareholders in the resulting company AB.
2. The A-C Merger: Freeze-out Transactions
This involves a merger transaction between company A and
another company C, which is controlled by A. The transaction can be
accomplished by buying out the minority shareholders of company C.
As a result, company A owns 100% of company C’s stock, and C’s
shareholders are no longer invested in company C.2 Freeze-outs can be

1. Freeze-out transactions (also known as squeeze-out transactions or minority
buyouts) involve one company’s merger with another company that the first one
controls. “Control” in this context has been defined as the ownership of more than 50%
of the company’s stock or “domination by a minority shareholder through actual control
of corporate conduct.” Citron v. Fairchild Camera & Instrument Corp., 569 A.2d 53, 70
(Del. 1989); see also Kahn v. Lynch Commc’n Sys., 638 A.2d 1110 (Del. 1994)
(finding that a shareholder exercised control over the corporate decisions despite its
minority shareholder status).
2. A freeze-out transaction can be carried out as a one-step or two-step merger. A
one-step merger would simply require the controlling company to buy out the minority
shareholders. In a two-step merger, the controlling company makes a tender offer to
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structured in myriad ways but the two types of transactions that are
important to this discussion are freeze-outs conducted as typical
negotiated mergers, and freeze-outs conducted via tender offers.
a. Negotiated Merger
Freeze-out transactions structured as typical negotiated mergers
have the controlling party on both sides of the deal, involve a special
committee with veto power, and are (by default) reviewed under the
entire fairness standard.3
b. Tender Offer
In a tender offer freeze-out, company A makes a tender offer for a
majority of company C’s shares, and then follows it with a short form
merger.4 Such freeze-outs have a controlling party negotiating with
minority shareholders, involve a special committee without veto power,
and are afforded more deference under the business judgment standard.5
B. FOUNDATIONS OF THE STANDARDS OF REVIEW: STATUTORY
REQUIREMENTS AND FIDUCIARY DUTIES
Standards of review exist to analyze the decisions of a board of
directors, but they do not dictate a particular line of conduct that a board
must follow in order to get deference from the courts.6 Standards of
review simply “describ[e] what a plaintiff must plead or prove to
overcome a defendant’s motion and ultimately prevail in the case.”7
However, the standards of review are closely connected to the fiduciary
duties that a board of directors must satisfy.

acquire at least 90% of the target company’s shares, and then instigates a short form
merger. See DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 253 (West 2014).
3. Guhan Subramanian, Fixing Freezeouts, 115 YALE L.J. 2, 22 (2005).
4. See DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 253 (West 2014).
5. Subramanian, supra note 3.
6. J. Travis Laster, Revlon Is a Standard of Review: Why It’s True and What It
Means, 19 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 5, 26 (2013).
7. Id.; see also Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Divergence of Standards of Conduct
and Standards of Review in Corporate Law, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 437 (1993).
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1. Statutory Requirements
Section 141 of the Delaware General Corporation Law sets forth
the powers and duties of the board of directors of a corporation,
bestowing upon the board the authority to make business decisions for
the corporation.8 Section 251 of the Delaware General Corporation Law
sets forth the conditions for a merger. It provides that a merger
transaction requires the approval of the board of directors of the
company as well as approval by a majority of shareholders.9
Predictably, board approval is required to ensure that the
transaction is viable for the corporation, while the shareholder vote is
required to alleviate any concerns regarding potential conflicts of
interest. These conflicts of interest can arise regardless of the manner in
which the merger transaction is structured. For instance, in the merger of
companies A and B as described above, there is the possibility that the
board of directors of the target company B may resist an otherwise
attractive offer of cash for the company’s stock because they have a
personal interest in maintaining their employment after the completion
of the merger.
Contrastingly, in the merger of companies A and C above,
company C’s board of directors may accept an inadequate offer to
protect their employment once company C is absorbed into company
A.10 In either scenario, there lies the potential that the board of directors
may make a decision about the merger that may not be in the best
interests of the corporation and its shareholders.
2. Fiduciary Duties
The board of directors owes a duty of care and a duty of loyalty to
the corporation’s shareholders. Whether the board’s conduct has
satisfied these duties determines the level of deference a board is likely
to be accorded. In the first instance, the court looks at the board’s
conduct to determine whether its acts were negligent. As long as the
8.
9.

DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 141 (West 2014).
DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 251 (West 2014). But see DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, §
253 (West 2014) (stating that merger can be accomplished without a shareholder vote
where the controlling corporation owns at least 90% of the shares of the target
corporation).
10. See infra p. 151.
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board of directors can show that its conduct was not grossly negligent or
in bad faith, it can satisfy the duty of care and is given deference under
the business judgment standard of review.11 Under this standard, the
court declines to “substitute its judgment for that of the board if the
latter’s decision can be ‘attributed to any rational business purpose.’”12
Alternatively, the presence of a “qualified decision maker” can
satisfy the court’s inquiry as well; if “an independent, disinterested, and
sufficiently informed decision maker” exists, the court would ordinarily
defer to its judgment under the business judgment rule.13 For a plaintiff
shareholder to rebut the presumption of care inherent in this standard of
review, it must prove that the qualified decision maker either “receiv[ed]
a personal benefit from the transaction not received by the shareholders
generally” or that the director “is a dual fiduciary and owes a competing
duty of loyalty to an entity . . . on the other side of the transaction.”14
The qualified decision maker is most likely to be an “independent,
disinterested, and sufficiently informed” board of directors, but the court
will also defer to a qualified decision maker in other instances. For
example, stockholders collectively can act as qualified decision makers,
as can a board committee.15
Similarly, the duty of loyalty imposes on the board a duty:
not only affirmatively to protect the interests of the corporation
committed to his charge, but also to refrain from doing anything that
would work injury to the corporation, or to deprive it of profit or
advantage . . . . The rule that requires an undivided and unselfish
loyalty to the corporation demands that there shall be no conflict
16
between duty and self-interest.

Consequently, when there is a direct conflict of interest—which violates
the board of directors’ duty of loyalty—the entire fairness standard is
applied. Where the board of directors of a corporation fails to act in the
interests of the shareholders, the court must assess the transaction to see
11.
12.

See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).
Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 949 (Del. 1985) (quoting
Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971)).
13. J. Travis Laster, The Effect of Stockholder Approval on Enhanced Scrutiny, 40
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1443, 1443 (2013).
14. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 884 A.2d 26 (Del. 2005); Laster, supra note
13, at 1452.
15. Laster, supra note 13, at 1456.
16. Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939).
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if it is objectively fair to the shareholders. The defendant-directors then
have the burden of showing that the entire transaction was fair to the
shareholders of the corporation, and that they acted in good faith.17
The Delaware courts, however, soon realized that there were a host
of transactions which did not fall into either of the above categories. The
landmark decisions of the Delaware court in Unocal and Revlon gave
rise to a third standard of review: the enhanced scrutiny test. Here, the
measure is “range of reasonableness,” i.e., whether the board’s decisions
were reasonable in the context of the transaction.18 As described by the
court in Unocal, the enhanced scrutiny test requires the directors to
show “(i) ‘reasonable grounds for believing that a danger to corporate
policy and effectiveness existed’ and (ii) a response to the danger that
was ‘reasonable in relation to the threat posed.’”19 The Revlon case
further developed this standard, and held that in the event where the sale
of a corporation is imminent, the duties of the board of directors shift
“from the preservation of [the company] as a corporate entity to the
maximization of the company’s value at a sale for the stockholders’
benefit.”20
The driving principle behind the Delaware court’s decisions in
Unocal and Revlon is that there are “potential conflicts of interest
present in a negotiated acquisition.”21 Many factors can influence the
board of directors to act in a manner that undercuts the best interests of
the corporation and its shareholders without resorting to acts that would
constitute self-dealing.22 The enhanced scrutiny standard was developed
to deal with these subtleties, which exist not only when the board is in
complete control of the corporation but also during the period of the
corporation’s final sale.23

17.
18.
19.
20.

See Unocal Corp., 493 A.2d at 952.
See id.
Laster, supra note 6, at 9 (quoting Unocal Corp., 493 A.2d at 955).
Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del.

1986).
21. Laster, supra note 6, at 7.
22. Id. at 18.
23. See id. at 16.
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II. DIFFERING STANDARDS OF REVIEW FOR CONFLICTED MERGER
TRANSACTIONS
This part of the Note traces two parallel (and occasionally
overlapping) paths in the case law defining the standards of review for
mergers: one, a result of Revlon’s application of Unocal, and the other, a
series of developments in the doctrine of freeze-out mergers.
A. THE A-B MERGER: ISSUES WITH APPLICATION OF THE STANDARD SET
FORTH IN UNOCAL/UNITRIN/REVLON
In Unocal, the board of directors was faced with a shareholder who
executed a two-tier tender offer for shares of the corporation. The board
responded to the inadequate offer with a plan to execute a self-tender for
the company’s shares while excluding the plaintiff shareholder. The
Unocal court famously held that:
[b]ecause of the omnipresent specter that a board may be acting
primarily in its own interests, rather than those of the corporation
and its shareholders, there is an enhanced duty which calls for
judicial examination at the threshold before the protections of the
24
business judgment rule may be conferred.

This heightened examination of the board’s decisions gave rise to the
enhanced scrutiny standard of review. However, it is important to note
that even within Unocal, there was a de-escalation of the standard of
review after the court’s initial inquiry. The enhanced scrutiny standard
was effectively part of a two-step inquiry into the board’s decisionmaking.25 Once the court determined that the board’s actions were
“reasonable in relation to the threat posed,” and thus, passed the
enhanced scrutiny test, the court deferred to the board under the business
judgment rule.26
In Unitrin, Inc. v. American General Corp., 651 A.2d 1361 (Del.
1995), the Delaware Supreme Court clarified the application of the
enhanced scrutiny standard laid out in Unocal. In Unitrin, the board of
directors of the corporation was faced with an offer by American
24.
25.

Unocal Corp., 493 A.2d at 954.
William T. Allen, Jack B. Jacobs & Leo E. Strine, Jr., Function over Form: A
Reassessment of Standards of Review in Delaware Corporation Law, 56 BUS. LAW.
1287, 1310 (2000).
26. Unocal Corp., 493 A.2d at 949.
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General Corporation. The board rejected the offer, on the grounds that it
was inadequate.27 American General, however, announced its plan for a
hostile takeover, and the board of Unitrin adopted a buyback plan as part
of its defensive measures against the threat.28 The court held that in
instances where the corporation faces the threat of a hostile takeover,
courts must examine first, whether the defensive measures adopted by
the board of directors are “draconian, by either being preclusive or
coercive and; second, . . . whether [the measures are] within a range of
reasonable responses to the threat.”29
Here, the court applied Unocal and examined the board’s actions
under the two-pronged test of reasonableness and proportionality.30 The
court found that the board of directors met the reasonableness prong
based not only on the board’s belief that American General’s offer was
inadequate but also because of “the presence of a majority of outside
independent directors.”31 The court also held that the board’s response in
adopting a repurchase program was proportional to the threat it faced
without “depriv[ing] the public stockholders of the ‘power to influence
corporate direction through the ballot.’”32
The court in Revlon further extended the enhanced scrutiny
standard to the sale of a corporation. In Revlon, the board of directors
faced a hostile takeover by Pantry Pride.33 In response, the board first
adopted several defensive measures, which the court found to be
reasonable in response to the takeover threat.34 However, once the board
realized that the sale of the corporation was inevitable, it began
selectively dealing with another buyer, Forstmann, to arrange a
leveraged buyout.35 Balancing deference to the business judgment of the
directors with “the omnipresent specter that a board may be acting
primarily in its own interests,” the court in Revlon found that the board

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1369 (Del. 1995).
Id. at 1370.
Id. at 1367.
See id. at 1373.
Id. at 1375.
Id. at 1383.
See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del.

1986).
34. Id.
35. Id.
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had failed to meet its responsibilities under Unocal.36 Once the sale of
the corporation was imminent, the court held that “[t]he directors’ role
changed from defenders of the corporate bastion to auctioneers charged
with getting the best price for the stockholders at a sale of the
company.”37
The case law since then has interpreted Revlon as requiring the
board of directors to satisfy a specific set of duties when the sale of a
company is inevitable. In Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time
Incorporated, Paramount made a tender offer for Time’s shares shortly
before Time finalized a stock-for-stock merger with Warner.38
Paramount sought to enjoin the Time-Warner merger after Time rejected
its offer as inadequate, but the court declined.39 Paramount claimed that
the Time-Warner merger agreement required the board to obey its
Revlon duties, and thus “to treat all other interested acquirers on an
equal basis” in order to maximize the value of the company for the
shareholders.40 The court held, instead, that the board had no specific
responsibility to transact with the company offering the highest
immediate value for the shareholders outside the context of Revlon.41
The court further described two scenarios that would trigger Revlon
duties:
The first, and clearer one, is when a corporation initiates an active
bidding process seeking to sell itself or to effect a business
reorganization involving a clear break-up of the company. . . .
However, Revlon duties may also be triggered where, in response to
a bidder’s offer, a target abandons its long-term strategy and seeks
42
an alternative transaction involving the breakup of the company.

According to this analysis, unless the sale or breakup of a
corporation is imminent or inevitable, Revlon duties are not triggered.
Keeping in line with this reading of Revlon, the court here held that
there was no “abandonment of the corporation’s continued existence,”

36. Id.; see also Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985);
Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984).
37. Revlon, Inc., 506 A.2d at 182 (Del. 1986).
38. See Paramount Commc’ns, Inc., v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989).
39. Id.
40. Id. at 1149.
41. Id. at 1151.
42. Id. at 1150.
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and thus, no further Revlon analysis was needed.43 The court also found
that the board reasonably perceived a threat, and adopted a reasonable
defensive measure.44 Accordingly, the board’s decisions passed the
enhanced scrutiny review under Unocal, and thus, the board’s actions
were given business judgment deference.45
In another case involving Paramount, the court faced a similar
question. Paramount was in talks with Viacom regarding the possibility
of a merger.46 Eventually, the Paramount board approved the
transaction, the terms of which included a number of defensive
measures.47 During this time, Paramount was also approached by QVC
but the board eventually rejected QVC’s bid because the directors did
not deem it to be in the “best interests of the stockholders.”48 When the
Paramount-Viacom transaction was challenged, the court found that the
Paramount board had failed to meet its duties under Revlon.49
Unlike the court in Time, which relied primarily on the absence of
an inevitable sale of the company, the QVC court gave great significance
to the sale of control of the corporation in assessing whether the Revlon
duties were triggered.50 The QVC court reasoned that “[w]hen a majority
of a corporation’s voting shares are acquired by a single person or entity
. . . there is a significant diminution in the voting power of those who
thereby become minority stockholders.”51 This change in control of a
corporation triggers the application of Revlon duties because the board is
once again under an obligation to maximize shareholder value.52 The
QVC court further clarified that an imminent sale of the company was
not the only scenario that would result in the application of Revlon
duties.53 Applying this standard, the court held that the Paramount board
had failed to meet the enhanced scrutiny review.
43.
44.
45.
46.

1993).
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id. at 1151.
Id. at 1152.
Id.
See Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34 (Del.
Id.
Id. at 41.
Id.
Id. at 42.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 46-47.
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Taken together, the Paramount cases seem to imply differing
standards of review based on how the transaction was conducted. If the
transaction results in a controlling party, Revlon applies.54 However, if
there is no controlling party, Revlon still applies in a cash-based
transaction but not in the case of a stock-for-stock merger.55
What is problematic, however, is that the Paramount cases presume
that there exists a set of specific Revlon duties in the first place:
One view of the holding in Revlon was that it was premised on a
duty (the duty to auction the company when it was for sale, or, less
woodenly, the duty to get the best price, or the duty not to
discriminate between bidders) that was different in some way from
ordinary director duties . . . . [O]nce a “sale” of the corporation was
in contemplation, “Revlon duties” would be thought to limit the
56
range of good faith business judgment that the board might make.

The Delaware courts quickly squashed this interpretation, holding that
the Revlon case “did not create a new or special regime.”57 As Vice
Chancellor Laster stated, “Revlon merely identified one special
circumstance in which the board of directors had narrowed the
investment horizon for maximizing stockholder value to a specific point
in time.”58 Thus, Revlon should not be read as creating new duties for
the board of directors which did not exist previously.59 Rather, Revlon,
like several cases that followed it, only sought to outline what
compliance with the pre-existing duties would look like in the context of
a sale.60
B. THE A-C MERGER: FREEZE-OUT TRANSACTIONS
The emergence of freeze-out transactions further complicated the
application of the enhanced scrutiny standard of review. Freeze-out
54. See J. Travis Laster, Exposing a False Dichotomy: The Implications of the NoTalk Cases for the Time/Revlon Double Standard, 3 DEL. L. REV. 179, 187 (2000); see
also J. Travis Laster, Revlon is a Standard of Review, 19 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 5,
37 (2013).
55. J. Travis Laster, Exposing a False Dichotomy: The Implications of the No-Talk
Cases for the Time/Revlon Double Standard, 3 DEL. L. REV. 179, 187 (2000).
56. Equity-Linked Inv’rs, L.P. v. Adams, 705 A.2d 1040, 1045 (Del. Ch. 1997).
57. Laster, supra note 55, at 201.
58. Id. at 205.
59. Id. at 204.
60. See generally Laster, supra note 55.
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transactions have been subject to differing standards of review based on
the procedural and substantive context of the merger. Freeze-outs
structured as negotiated mergers have typically been reviewed under the
entire fairness standard, while those structured as tender offers have
been afforded the more lenient business judgment review.61
1. Negotiated Merger
The landmark case Weinberger v. UOP addressed the standard of
review applicable to freeze-outs conducted as typical merger
transactions. The facts of this case are as follows: Signal had a cash
surplus and invested some of its cash by acquiring a majority of UOP’s
stock via a tender offer.62 Then, failing to find any other attractive
investment opportunities for the remaining cash surplus, Signal began
assessing the possibility of acquiring the remaining outstanding shares
of UOP.63 In the negotiations that followed, two UOP directors who
were also employees of Signal prepared a “feasibility report” for Signal
but failed to disclose this material information to the other, outside UOP
directors.64 The report mentioned that Signal could profitably acquire the
outstanding UOP shares “at any price up to $24 each,” a fact that was
not disclosed to the independent directors of UOP.65 In fact, the price
actually proposed to UOP’s board and its minority shareholders was $21
per share.66 The court in Weinberger drew upon the duty of loyalty
principles, and opined that “[w]hen directors of a Delaware corporation
are on both sides of a transaction, they are required to demonstrate their
utmost good faith and the most scrupulous inherent fairness of the
bargain.”67 The court held that the transaction would be reviewed under
the entire fairness test, which (among other showings) must include a
showing of fair price and fair dealing.68
In the cases that followed Weinberger, there was a lack of clarity
over the standard of review applicable in cases where a cash-out merger
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

See supra Section I.A.2.
Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 703 (Del. 1983).
Id. at 705.
Id. at 705, 707.
Id.
Id. at 707.
Id. at 710.
See id. at 710-11.
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had been approved by an independent special committee.69 Delaware
courts were divergent in their application of Weinberger: some cases
held that the presence of an independent committee only operated as a
burden-shifting mechanism, while others contended that the committee’s
approval de-escalated the standard of review to the business judgment
rule.70 Kahn v. Lynch Communications clarified this split, and
established entire fairness as the applicable standard of review in freezeout mergers.71 Based in part on the court’s holding in Weinberger, the
court in Lynch held that:
[t]he initial burden of establishing entire fairness rests upon the party
who stands on both sides of the transaction. However, an approval of
the transaction by an independent committee of directors or an
informed majority of minority shareholders shifts the burden of
proof on the issue of fairness from the controlling or dominating
72
shareholder to the challenging shareholder-plaintiff.

In order to trigger the burden-shifting mechanism, however, the special
committee must also be “truly independent, fully informed, and [have]
the freedom to negotiate at arm’s length.”73 As is apparent in the court’s
analysis, the court declined to apply business judgment review, even if
the transaction had been approved by either an independent committee
or a majority of the minority shareholders. “[The] Court recognized that
it would be inconsistent with its holding in Weinberger to apply the
business judgment rule in the context of an interested merger
transaction, which, by its very nature, did not require a business
purpose.”74
The court in Kahn v. M&F Worldwide75 outlined the procedural
protections that must be in place in order to de-escalate the standard of
review from entire fairness to the business judgment rule, as applicable
to freeze-out mergers. In M&F Worldwide, a controlling shareholder
sought to buy out the outstanding shares of MFW, subject to approval
69. See Citron v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 584 A.2d 490 (Del. Ch. 1990);
see also Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156 (Del. Ch. 1991).
70. See Kahn v. Lynch Commc’n Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1115 (Del. 1994).
71. See id.
72. Id. at 1117 (citation omitted).
73. Id. at 1120-21; see also Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil Co., 493 A.2d 929, 937 (Del.
1985).
74. See Lynch, 638 A.2d at 1116.
75. Kahn v. M&F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635 (Del. 2014).
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by MFW’s board of directors, an independent special committee, and a
majority of the non-controlling shareholders.76 While the plaintiffs
argued that even the combination of these procedural safeguards could
prove to be insufficient in guarding the interests of the minority
shareholders, the court held that the business judgment standard would
apply to the transaction if:
(i) the controller conditions the procession of the transaction on the
approval of both a Special Committee and a majority of the minority
stockholders; (ii) the Special Committee is independent; (iii) the
Special Committee is empowered to freely select its own advisors
and to say no definitively; (iv) the Special Committee meets its duty
of care in negotiating a fair price; (v) the vote of the minority is
77
informed; and (vi) there is no coercion of the minority.

The court here ensured that a variety of procedural protections had to be
in place in order to neutralize the power of the controlling party to
influence the transaction.
2. Tender Offer
Tender offer freeze-outs have typically been accorded business
judgment review because the controlling party is only on one side of the
transaction, eliminating the threat of self-dealing that is present in the
typical freeze-out mergers.78 One instance of this is the court’s holding
in In re Siliconix.79 In that case, the majority shareholder sought to
acquire all of the remainder of the company’s stock via a cash tender
offer, which was then changed to a proposal for a stock-for-stock
transaction after the special committee rejected the offered share price.80
The controlling shareholder proceeded with the transaction without the
special committee’s approval.81 The transaction was nonetheless subject

76.
77.
78.

Id. at 640.
Id. at 645.
Subramanian, supra note 3, at 18; see also Solomon v. Pathe Commc’n Corp.,
672 A.2d 35 (Del. 1996).
79. See In re Siliconix Inc. S’holder Litig., No. Civ. A. 18700, 2001 WL 716787
(Del. Ch. 2001).
80. Id. at *2-4.
81. Id. at *4.
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to approval by a majority of the minority shareholders.82 The court held
that the controlling shareholder had “no duty to offer any particular
price, or a ‘fair’ price, to the minority shareholders of Siliconix unless
actual coercion or disclosure violations [were] shown,” and
consequently declined to apply the entire fairness standard of review.83
This holding derives partly from the law established in Solomon v. Pathe
Communications where the court held that without evidence of coercion
or inadequate disclosure, the tender offer is deemed voluntary, and thus
there is no duty to offer a certain price.84
However, the courts soon recognized the inherent imbalance in
negotiations between controlling parties and minority shareholders in
tender offer freeze-outs. In In re Pure Resources, Inc., the court sought
to reconcile—at least in part—“the divergent policy choices made in
Lynch and Solomon” by nesting the principles of Solomon within the
analysis under Lynch.85 The court held that the entire fairness standard
of review would apply to such transactions if the tender offer is
coercive.86 The offer would be deemed non-coercive only if it was
“subject to a non-waivable majority of the minority tender condition,”
“the controlling stockholder [promised] to consummate a prompt § 253
merger at the same price if it [obtained] more than 90% of the shares,”
and “the controlling stockholder . . . made no retributive threats.”87
However, these factors are all in control of the controlling shareholder,
and minority shareholders have no way of challenging them.
As noted earlier, the Paramount cases apply the enhanced scrutiny
standard of review in two instances: one, where the transaction is cashbased, and two, where the transaction is stock-based but also results in
the presence of a controlling shareholder after the transaction.88 This is
primarily because the voting power of the resulting minority
shareholders significantly weakens.89 However, as Vice Chancellor
Laster has argued, the underlying principle of this standard is the
82.
83.
84.
85.

Id. at *4.
Id. at *6.
Solomon v. Pathe Commc’n Corp., 672 A.2d 35, 39 (Del. 1996).
In re Pure Res., Inc., S’holder Litig., 808 A.2d 421, 439 (Del. Ch. 2002); see
also Solomon, 672 A.2d 35.
86. In re Pure Res., Inc., S’holder Litig., 808 A.2d at 445-46.
87. Id. at 445; see also DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 253 (West 2014).
88. Laster, supra note 6, at 6-7.
89. See Paramount Commc’n, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 42 (Del.
1993).
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presence of potential conflicts of interest, which exist in all negotiated
transactions, whether they are conducted in cash or stock,90 and whether
they are in the form of a freeze-out merger or a freeze-out tender offer.
Understandably, if the transaction uniquely benefits a controlling
party to the exclusion of other shareholders, the appropriate standard of
review is entire fairness, even if a qualified decision maker exists.91 In
that case, “neither a special committee nor a majority-of-the-minority
vote . . . [nor] [a]n independent stockholder vote” alone is enough to
deescalate the standard of review from entire fairness.92 The special
dynamics that exist within a corporation in the presence of a controlling
party essentially neutralize the power of committees and independent
stockholder votes (and, in the case of tender offers, the stockholders’
tenders of their shares) because the controlling party exerts influence “at
both the board and stockholder levels.”93 However, as seen in Lynch, the
presence of a special committee or a majority-of-the-minority vote can
shift the burden on to the plaintiff shareholder, requiring it to establish
that the transaction was unfair. This burden-shifting mechanism,
however, is not at play in the case of freeze-outs conducted as tender
offers.
What remains unclear is whether the standards of review for all
freeze-outs (whether conducted through tender offers or as typical
mergers) should be streamlined into one. Although M&F Worldwide did
unify the standard of review for both types of freeze-outs by deescalating the standard of review for typical freeze-out mergers to
business judgment review instead of entire fairness, the unification of
the standards only occurs if the procedural protections outlined in M&F
Worldwide are applied by the board and deemed acceptable by the
court.94 As seen above, for freeze-out transactions, the procedural
protections can be challenged and may lead to a burden-shifting
analysis.95 If the court’s inquiry is satisfied, the standard of review for
the board’s conduct again shifts dramatically from one extreme to

90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

See id. at 33, 35.
Laster, supra note 13, at 1461.
Id.
Id. at 1460.
See Kahn v. M&F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635 (Del. 2014).
See supra Section II.B.1; see also Kahn v. Lynch Commc’n Sys., Inc., 639
A.2d 1110, 1115 (Del. 1994).
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another.96 It is important to note, however, that these concerns do not
arise in freeze-out tender offers: there is nothing for the shareholder to
challenge there, as long as the board refrains from making threats.97
Additionally, the standards of review for freeze-out mergers remain
entirely removed from the enhanced scrutiny standard set out in Unocal
and Revlon, even though the underlying principle behind the latter
cases—addressing conflicts of interest that endanger stockholder
interests—seems to be present in freeze-out transactions as well.
Specifically, in a typical freeze-out merger, the controlling party is on
both sides of the transaction, and in a tender offer freeze-out, the
controlling party often has disproportionate bargaining power compared
to the minority shareholders with whom it negotiates. Both of these
circumstances endanger the shareholders’ interests. Furthermore, as has
been noted in current literature, the business judgment review afforded
to all tender offer freeze-outs may not be sufficient to look after the
interests of the minority shareholders, while an “entire fairness review
for all freeze-outs may deter some value creating transactions.”98
III. PROPOSED SOLUTION: UNIFIED STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR
CONFLICTED TRANSACTIONS
A. APPLYING THE UNOCAL/REVLON ENHANCED SCRUTINY STANDARD TO
FREEZE-OUT MERGERS
There is an intermediate standard of review that is available to
address the imperfect extremes of judicial review under the business
judgment standard and the entire fairness standard. The enhanced
scrutiny review, applied above to A-B merger transactions,99 should be
made available to A-C merger transactions as well.
As discussed earlier, the potential for conflicts of interest lies in AB and A-C transactions because the board may feel compelled to act in
ways that betray its allegiance to the corporation and the corporation’s
shareholders.100 Although A-B and A-C mergers are structured
96.
97.

See M&F Worldwide, 88 A.3d at 635.
See In re Pure Res., Inc., S’holder Litig., 808 A.2d 421, 439 (Del. Ch. 2002);
see also In re Siliconix Inc. S’holder Litig., No. Civ. A. 18700, 2001 WL 716787 (Del.
Ch. 2001).
98. See Subramanian, supra note 3, at 22.
99. See supra Section II.A.
100. See supra Section II.B.1.
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differently, this conflict is at the core of both types of transactions.101 In
both instances, the intermediate level of scrutiny serves to address this
issue: that there may be instances where the board’s conduct is not
grossly negligent but where the “omnipresent specter” is nonetheless at
play.102 The intermediate scrutiny standard will also guard against
instances where the qualified decision maker, if one exists, is unable to
act as intended in the presence of such conflicts of interest.
Thus, enhanced scrutiny should be the appropriate standard of
review for conflicted transactions, even those that employ procedural or
substantive protections to safeguard the interests of minority
shareholders. Adopting the enhanced scrutiny standard for mergers
involving conflicts of interest would extend the application of the case
law established by Unocal and its progeny beyond the traditional
negotiated transactions, and apply it to the many forms of freeze-out
transactions. Applying the enhanced scrutiny standard would also
eliminate a two-step review, and prevent the de-escalation from one
extreme level of review to another.
B. INTERPRETING M&F WORLDWIDE AND SILICONIX AS SATISFACTION OF
THE BOARD’S DUTIES UNDER REVLON
Before enhanced scrutiny can be effectively applied to such
mergers, however, there needs to be a final clarification of the duties of
a board under Unocal and Revlon. As Vice Chancellor Laster has
discussed (and contrary to popular interpretation), there does not seem
to be a set of specific Revlon duties that a board must undertake when
the sale of a corporation is imminent.103 The enhanced scrutiny standard
cannot be effectively applied to freeze-out transactions until the board’s
duties have been clarified, especially because freeze-out transactions are
analogous to final-sale transactions because they result in the buyout of
minority shareholders.104 Finally, as Vice Chancellor Laster contends,
“the perceived double standard for director conduct in change-of-control

101.
102.
103.
104.

See supra Section II.B.1.
See supra text accompanying note 24.
J. Travis Laster, Exposing a False Dichotomy, 3 DEL. L. REV. 179, 219 (2000).
See id.
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transactions and stock-for-stock mergers is a false dichotomy . . . there
are no special and distinct Revlon duties.”105
The aim of the Revlon duties is to ensure that the board of directors
treats all bidders equally in the event of the corporation’s sale.106 These
so-called Revlon duties then apply only in that context (or in an
analogous one).107 This Note proposes that in order to grant enhanced
scrutiny review to mergers involving conflicts of interest, cases such as
M&F Worldwide and Siliconix should be viewed as describing the ways
in which a board of directors can satisfy its fiduciary duties under each
case’s particular circumstances. This would consolidate the divergent
case law and bring clarity by enforcing a uniform standard of review.
M&F Worldwide and In re Pure Resources should be viewed as
satisfying the court’s analysis under enhanced scrutiny review for
freeze-out transactions conducted as typical mergers and via tender
offers, respectively. Under this interpretation, the enhanced scrutiny
standard would still maintain the flexibility to prescribe how a board
may satisfy its duties in a particular instance. Thus, if A-C mergers are
reviewed under the enhanced scrutiny standard (traditionally applied to
A-B mergers), then M&F Worldwide and its antecedents can be nested
under the Unocal/Revlon analysis.
In proposing a unified standard of review for all mergers where
there is a conflict of interest, this Note does not contend that the
business judgment review and the entire fairness standard are obsolete.
Rather, those two standards of review are at opposite ends of the
spectrum, and should be applied where there is either an obvious
violation (or lack thereof) of the board’s fiduciary duties. In all other
transactions involving conflicts of interest, the courts should apply
enhanced scrutiny as a one-step standard of review.
CONCLUSION
Delaware doctrine on the standards of review for mergers has its
roots in the landmark cases of Unocal and Revlon. However, the
analysis employed in these cornerstone cases needs to be effectively

105.
106.

Id.
See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del.

1986).
107. See generally Revlon, Inc, 506 A.2d 173; Paramount Commc’n, Inc. v. QVC
Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 42 (Del. 1993).
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applied to the complex and varied structures of merger transactions in
order to ensure the balance between the preservation of shareholder
interests and the maintenance of a board’s autonomy to make business
decisions. In the extreme instance where the board of directors is
embroiled in a glaring conflict of interest, the courts should certainly
require the board to demonstrate that the entire transaction was fair to
the shareholders. At the opposite end of the spectrum, where it is
apparent that the board made a reasonable business decision, the courts
should continue to accord the directors the protections of the business
judgment rule.
For transactions that hold the possibility of a conflict of interest and
that threaten to disrupt the balance between shareholder interests and
board autonomy, there exists a fitting intermediate standard of scrutiny
as set forth in Revlon and Unocal. The enhanced scrutiny standard is
based on the principles of balancing the sometimes-conflicting interests
of those who make the decisions and those who are most affected by
them. Despite the several forms of structuring merger transactions, this
tension between the conflicting interests almost always exists.
It is only appropriate then, to apply a uniform standard of review to
these transactions instead of altering the standard to accommodate the
structural complexities of the merger. While calling for this uniform
standard’s application to mergers involving a conflict of interest, this
Note does not suggest that the Delaware courts’ holdings over the last
four decades should be disregarded entirely. Rather, the Note argues that
the courts’ holdings over the years should be merged into the enhanced
scrutiny standard itself, instead of the vacillation between entire fairness
and business judgment review. The enhanced scrutiny review, alone,
efficiently looks after conflicting interests that lie at the heart of many
merger transactions.

